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When invited to deliver this talk my first inclination was to demur 
as there were few Bayesians who were not better equipped for such an 
assignment by virtue of being more familiar with Jeffreys' works and 
views. Indeed, I have never heard him speak, never met him nor in fact 
even know what he looks like, though I understand that he is currently in 
his 87th year. However, the opportunity of paying tribute to a very 
distinguished scientist and in the process enhancing my own knowledge of 
the thinking of a pioneer Bayesian soon overcame my initial hesitation. 
In my own formal statistical education there was at least one 
glaring deficiency attributable to the then prevalent Zeitgeist (embodied 
in the Neyman-Pearson-Wald interpretation) which rendered the Bayesian 
approach, at worst, totally erroneous, at best, too restrictive and 
somewhere in between, outmoded. But my subsequent neglect of the 
writings of Jeffreys is mainly ascribable to laziness and being slightly 
put off by the unfamiliar logician's style in his Theory 2!_ Probability 
(1939), palatable mainly to those who delight in the Russell-Whitehead 
Principia mode. This was particularly evident in his rather distinctive 
notation for probability functions. Of course, these self-indulgent 
excuses would rarely be.tolerated in a graduate student. 
At any rate, it was not Jeffreys, not Savage, and certainly not 
de Finetti, but most curiously Fisher in his outrageous fiducial mode 
especially his book Statistical Methods~ Scientific Inference (1956) 
who indirectly persuaded me of the Bayesian view and impelled me to 
develop Bayesian solutions for statistical problems. Afterwards when I 
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was first exposed to Jeffreys' book, Theory £f Probability, I had the 
feeling that if one carefully scrutinized the work one could very likely 
find Bayesian solutions to most statistical problems -- but exasperatingly, 
the search often seemed to require nearly as much effort as the research. 
And also there was the brilliant Jimmy Savage, that all too prophetic 
and persuasive popularizer of Bayes, or, if one preferred pronouncements 
articulate, tones well-modulated, reasoning flawless, with accent impeccably 
British, there was his chief apostle to the heathen abroad, Dennis Lindley. 
But my acquaintance with the work of that 20th century master Bayesian and 
postulator of original ignorance (sin as some ~ould have it) or a reasonable 
facsimile thereof, Sir Harold Jeffreys, was slight. So, I began again to 
read Jeffreys in order to try to summarize his contributions to Bayesian 
inference~ First, one must realize that Fisher, aside fron statistics, 
was also a superb geneticist andapplied mathematician, if not an eccentric 
eugenicist. Jeffreys, it turns out, is even more the Renaissance man. 
The field of statistics aside, his knowledge is broad and his contributions 
are legion -- to sciences, such as physics, astronomy, geology, cosmogony; 
to philosophy, especially logic; and to applied mathematics. He published 
several excellent books on conventional applied mathematics, elucidating 
mathematical methods that would serve physical scientists. He published 
papers on cosmogony, the origin of the universe, and then a book entitled 
!h! Earth--Its Origin, History ~Constitution, (192-9) so that literally 
his purview was all things relating to heaven and earth and especially, 
to quote Genesis "In the beginning." This engaging In-the-beginning 
syndrome is also reflected in his statistical work as I shall shortly 
discuss. 
In order to appreciate and perhaps understand Jeffreys' attitude 
towards statistical inference, one must first discern his 
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views on epistemology~- the theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge 
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-- or as O. Kempthorne once, crudely but succinctly, put it "the knowledge 
racket;" and secondly, Jeffreys' attitude towards scientific endeavor. 
His book, Scientific Inference (1931), addressed the question of the 
nature of inference from empirical data so as to predict events that may 
occur in the future or retrodict experiences that were unrecorded in the 
past. It was Jeffreys' view that the goal of science, which is to 
deepen our understanding of natural processes, could best be accomplished 
or verified by the predictive capacity resulting from the modelling system. 
Clearly then, Jeffreys was philosophically a predictivist, although his 
applications did not always emphasize this perspective as much as one 
would expect.~ I suspect he was distracted from this goal because he 
wanted to provide solutions for the then contemporary statistical paradigms 
which stressed parametric estimation, in order for his work to obtain a 
hearing amongst statisticians. Also advising scientists on the measure-
ment of physical constants with an apparatus subject to error must have 
been of some concern to him as well as his view that physical laws were 
probabilistic in nature and involved these entities. 
Returning to the book, Scientific Inference -- it begins with a 
witty and perceptive Platonic dialogue between a botanist and a logician 
elucidating induction and scientific law or more mundanely establishing 
that inference from past observations to future ones cannot be deductive. 
Jeffreys insisted that all scientific laws were tentative (just as 
Fisher insisted that all hypotheses were provisional) exhibiting uncer-
tainty and were essentially successive approximations that never achieve 
1. Oral communication. 
2. In this regard it is curious to note that Jeffreys (1939) who discerned 
that Karl Pearson's Grammar~ Science (1892) was inconsistent with some of 
his later papers, accuses Pearson of not being much influenced by his own 
writings as one would expect. 
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finality. Incidentally, for a physicist he had a deep appreciation of 
biological variation as can be inferred from the dialogue. He believed 
that it was no different in kind from variation in physics though perhaps 
different in degree, at a time when physicists were still enhanced by the 
"exactness" of their science embodied in what he called the certainty and 
exactness fallacies, (i.e., that scientific laws are statements made with 
certainty and physical measurements can be exact) two fallacies which he 
attacked vigorously. 
He also maintained that to give any systematic account of the scien-
tific method, it is necessary to have a conception of partial proof -- a 
many valued logic or a probabilistic logic where for him probability is 
a relationship between a set of data and a conclusion in the sense of 
representing degrees of reasonable belief. Probabilistic logic then 
must serve as the basis for the inductive argument and in fact, the 
inductive argumant is a "logical" argument only within the context of a 
Bayesian framework. 
It is instructive to trace the origin of Jeffreys' philosophical 
platform. In England in the 19th century, empiricism was on the ascendancy; 
experience was to be the sole guide. This empirical view was a form of 
idealism, that theory of knowledge which maintained nothing exists but 
the mind of the observer and that the external world is merely a mental 
construct to give oneself a convenient way of describing one's experience. 
Its competitor was the, then, form of realism, a theory of knowledge that 
held that the external world exists independent of the observer and that 
the function of the scientific method is to discover its properties. A 
special form of idealism called phenomenalism, developed by Karl Pearson 
(1892) and Ernst Mach (1883) asserted that nothing can be presumed to exist that 
cannot be reduced to a description of sensations. It requires analysis of 
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suggested scientific laws to exhibit what they actually say about exper~ 
ience and if such a law refers to quantities whose values do not effect 
the prediction of experience, then the law should be restated so that 
these quantities do not appear in it. Although this Pearson-Mach 
formulation of idealism was Jeffreys' early philosophical stance, later 
he felt it was too stringent. In particular, he did not think that 
everything mentioned in a scientific law must be separately observable. 
His position came to be what he called critical realsim which he describes 
as one that maintains that inferences that go beyond the original observa-
tions are valid though uncertain as opposed to either naive realism or 
idealism which required that inferences about observations or parameters 
be ma.de with certainty. 
Given his views, Jeffreys set out to construct a logical apparat for 
scientific induction which is Bayesian in form. Using his approach in his 
books, he set forth in detail a comprehensive and normative Bayesian in~ 
ferential approach for a wide variety of statistical paradigms in estimation 
and testing -- but scantily few for prediction -- which is surprising, 
considering some of his initially stated aims. It is likely, as I have 
previously ment"ioned, that he wanted to display and compare the Bayesian 
approach with its competitors which had paid little or no.attention to 
prediction and that certain parameters can potentially be more than just 
artificial, or even conceptually meaningful constructs to physical scientists. 
It would take too long to catalogue his clever resolutions for these paradigms, 
many of which are, no doubt, quite familiar to you. Jeffreys' views were first 
put forth during the massive tide directed against inverse probability, initiated 
by the works of Fisher (1922) and carried on by Neyman (1937) -- whose preeminence 
and authority was such that non-Bayesian approaches became all pervasive 
during the 30's and 40's of this century. Almost a solitary Bayesian 
force during this entire period, Jeffreys managed to resuscitate Bayesianism 
and give it form (logical status) and substance (solutions for the pressing 
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statistical paradigms of the day). Early on he was attacked by Fisher (1934) 
because his theory, involving logical degrees of rational belief, was not a 
frequency theory -- which Jeffreys in turn severely. criticized in his books 
(1931, 1939) and sundry papers. 
Few have engaged in polemics with Fisher and come away unscathed--
and Jeffreys was no exception. An example of just such an exchange occurred 
some 45 years ago. It concerned the probability that a third measurement 
was included in the interval found by the first two--all being.independently 
and identically distributed. Without commenting on the details--the polemics 
themselves are of some interest. In a heavy-handed though partially astute 
rejoinder to an attack by Fisher (1933), Jeffreys (1933) says: 
''Fisher proceeds to reduce my theory to absurdity by 
integrating with respect to all values of the observed measures. 
This procedure involves a fundamental confusion, which pervades 
the whole of his statistical work, and deprives it of all meaning." 
Fisher's response (1934.), more temperate than usual, was nevertheless 
rapier sharp in its thrust: 
11Any defence which Jeffreys might have to offer of his 
omission to perform these integrations is thus lost in a polemical haze which his subsequent paragraphs do nothing to elucidate. I 
am not inclined to deny that the integrations reduce Jeffreys' 
theory to absurdity." 
For Jeffreys to come off second best, irrespective of the validity 
of his arguments, to an acknowledged master of polemics, is really no 
cause for surprise or chagrin especially when he could devise such a 
strikmgly penetrating summary of Fisher's significance testing program 
by poignantly heaping negative upon potential in a resounding 
crescendo: 
"What the use of P[the significance level] implies, 
therefore, is that a hypotheses tha~ may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted observable results that have not 
occurred." Jeffreys (1939) 
More generally Fisher (1934) accused Jeffreys of being subjective and 
psychological--committing the archsin of subjectivisim. Thirty years 
i 
I 
'-' 
'1 
: ! 
.. 
-7 
later, when this very sin suddenly turned into a God-like commandment 
under a new dispensation, he was accused of violating it by Savage and 
others. Savage (1962) labelled .Jeffreys' theory as a "necessary theory", 
that is an objective one, and faulted it for not being subjective and then 
somewhat paradoxically insisted that the only objective theory possible 
is a subjective one. One begins to wonder at the arcane use of the terms 
objective and subjective and whether to call .Jeffreys' arguments subjective or 
objective is at all relevant. For if they are subjective as Fisher would have 
it, then there is an enormous attempt at objectivity in providing standards 
for prior distributions depending on circumstances, and if basically the theory 
is objective (often pejoratively designated naive3) as Savage would have it, 
then the closely argued and intricate analyses for many of his canonical 
prior distributions w::,uld make any subjectivist envious. 
Of course the single major criticism leveled at .Jeffreys by the 
subjectivistic dispensation has been his attempts to quantify or express 
knowing little or ignorance, as it were • .Jeffreys responds that it is 
not an exact quantification but some sort of workable approximation and 
that it is a necessary ingredient for any Bayesian view. He grants that 
if one has some prior information it can be taken into account. But, he 
did not think that this was sufficient justification for not having some 
prior canonical expression for approximating knowing little. To judge from 
his writings, his reasons were twofold, the first could be termed the 
"Watergate Interrogatory Syndrome". Those of you who recall those memorable 
hearings can hardly forget Senator Howard Baker's thundering refrain when 
interrogating a witness, "What did you know and when did you know it?" 
Presumably, by such a device a subjective assessor who had some prior informa.-
3 It is possible that this disparaging label actually derives from an attempt 
at turning the tables on .Jeffreys' (1931) characterization of certain extreme 
epistemologies as naive realism and naive idealism. But perhaps this imputes 
a much deeper meaning to the intended criticism. 
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tion would be driven back to the cradle or womb if necessary to reveal a time 
when what he knew was negligible or irrelevant to the matter at hand. His 
second reason was,I suppose, the public nature of science where one hoped a set 
of data could speak for itself and that the prior distribution was to set 
the Bayesian machinery in motion providing some initial neutral or impartial 
stance. If different individuals guess at their prior probabilities, they 
will ordinarily be different and the subjectivist considers this to be 
beyond remedy. But to Jeffreys this was the very reason to seek some 
canonical rule. In fact, to Savage's sta~ement that it has proved impossible 
to give a satisfactory definition of the tempting expression "know nothing!' 
.Jeffreys (1963) responds "Who needs a definition." And, so it goes. 
Although I do not have the time to present a catalogue of the 
contributions to Bayesian inference by Jeffreys, I would like to give at 
least a cameo presentation, extracted from Wrinch and .Jeffreys (1921) 
and Jeffreys (1939), which in some sense reflects much of the flavor of 
his approach. 
Recall the Bayes-Laplace rule of succession for binary events. 
Suppose x1, x2 , ••• , Xn ••• is a sequence of independent Bernoulli 
trials each with probability 8 of being Type I say. The Bayes~Laplace 
assumption of a uniform prior density on 0 yields (t+l)/(n-K2) for the 
chance of a Type I event on the n+l trial given t Type I observations 
on the first n trials. If t = n and n grows then the probability of 
a Type I on a future trial tends to 1 • This was applied by many as an 
argument for induction of a general claim (that a particular law is always 
true). More than 55 years ago .Jeffreys recast the problem using a finite 
total number of binary trials say, N where an unknown number R is of one 
type and N-R of another. A san ple of n is drawn and the number T 
of type I is observed with probability 
I 
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Pr(T=tfn,N,R) = 
9 
(R)(N-R) 
t n-t 
(N) 
n 
t = 0,1, ••• , min(R,n) 
= 0 , elsewhere. 
The object now is to predict R. Assuming ignorance he posits a prior 
uniform probability on R, 
Pr(R=r(N) = (N+l)-l 
for r = O, 1, ... , N • 
Calculation of the predictive probability now yields 
Pr(R=rfN, n T=t) = r = t, ••• , N-n+t 
= 0 elsewhere • 
. 
The computation of the predictive probability that the n+l observation 
is of type I is the expectation ofthe probability of this event given 
T, N, n, and R wrt the above predictive probability for R • This 
yields 
E-.(~] t+l 
-a N-n = n+2 
identical to the Bayes-Laplace rule of succession but with. a finite 
horizon. In fact, this whole set-up is an observational or aparauietric 
analogue of the original parametric model. 
Now suppose the sample is wholly of Type I, i.e. t = n and a general 
law is at issue which states that all of the N trials are of Type I or 
generally of one kind. Then to Jeffreys, the chance that R = N should not 
be small if there is some real general law at stake. Calculation yields 
P(R=N(N, n, T=n) = :!i 
which is obviously small as N grows, for fixed n. Thi~ fact Jeffreys 
considers to be an unmitigated disaster for the Bayes-Laplace rule of 
succession to be a useful inductive argument. He reasons that common 
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sense dictates that if a long series of trials were all of one kind, a 
feeling that this phenomenon would persistshould be induced i.e. would be 
a true law,which would essentially be denied in the Bayes-Laplace formu-
lation. Without giving all of the details of his argument, he revises 
the prior probability, 
( I ) l-2k PR=rN =~ for r = 2, ••• , N-1 
P(R=O(N) = P(R=NfN) = k 
where (N+l)-l ~ k ~ 1/2, 
to attain a predictive probability more in accord with common sense 
( I ) ~n+l)~N-l)k p R=N N, n, T=n = (n+l) N-l)k+(N-n)(l-2k) 
His next step is to posit a reasonable value for k. For N = 2 he notes 
that (N+l)-l = l/3. Since 1/4 is then too small he tentatively assigns. 
k = 1/4 + 2(~+l) whose values are l/2 if N = 1, 5/12 if N = 2 etc., 
this yields 
n+l 
so that as N grows the above tends to n+g which he regards as 
entirely sensible. He recommends this solution whenever there is a 
serious possibility that a set of trials under consideration will all be 
of one type. This cameo portrait of his reasoning, at the very least, 
certainly refutes the charge that he was always trying·to define ignorance. 
If one were to present a short selected summary of Jeffreys' contributions 
to Bayesian inference, I believe the following would be on everybody's list. 
1. He made the inductive argument a "logical" o:ie within the context 
of a Bayesian framework and maintained it could only be so within 
this framework. 
I : 
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2. He made a valiant attempt to quantify lack of knowledge by giving 
rather clever canonical rules and conventions but was not con-
strained to think only in these terms. 
3. He produced a normative catalogue of cogently reasoned 
Bayesian solutions to many conventional statistical paradigms. 
4. He introduced and developed invariance considerations into the 
Bayesian system. 
5. His devastating critiques of the various frequency theories 
propounded by Venn, Fisher, Neymann and others were in the 
words of de Finetti (1970), "closely argued and unanswerable". 
In summary, Jeffreys' approach amalgainated a Bayesian system with 
two primitive data principles reflective of public scientific work: 
(1) Letting the data speak for themselves and (2) the actual units in 
which you choose to express your work should by and large not effect the 
inferenee. This is translated into so-called non-informative priors and 
invariance under suitable transformations. It was a rather remarkable 
conception, brilliantly executed, whose ultimate test is how it works in 
practice. 
Indeed, I believe we all owe a great debt to Sir Harold Jeffreys which 
I personally am delighted to be able to publicly acknowledge. 
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